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FRAUD ON THE SURVIVING SPOUSE IN JEWISH AND AMERICAN
LAW: A MODEL CHAPTER FOR A JEWISH LAW CASEBOOK
Jeffrey L Roth*
INTRODUCTION
THIS ARTICLE BEGINS WITH A PREFATORY note to explain its format.
The article presents comparative law material in the form of a model
chapter for a Jewish law casebook. The purpose of the prefatory note is
to sketch the background of this project.
At many American law schools, courses and seminars in Jewish law
have become an established feature of the curriculum. In recent years, the
field has experienced dramatic growth in the number and variety of
course offerings.' The most striking recognition of the place Jewish law
has achieved in American legal education came in 1992 when the Associ-
ation of American Law Schools created a Section on Jewish Law.
While students register for Jewish law courses for a variety of
academic, professional, and religious reasons, certain topics tend to
interest them the most. For example, what is the role of law in protecting
the environment? Do the homeless have legal rights enforceable against
society at large? Are there ever circumstances under which abortion is
justified? Or capital punishment? Or euthanasia? May a law ever distin-
guish between individuals based on their gender? What all of these
questions have in common is an important moral dimension, coupled with
the fact that the secular legal system to date has failed to supply a
definitive answer that is satisfactory to shape a national consensus on the
* Associate Professor of Law, Touro College Jacob D. Fuchsberg Law Center.
B.A., Yeshiva University 1968; M.A., Columbia University 1969; J.D., Yale Law
School 1974. The author would like to thank Professors Steven F. Friedell and Rena
Seplowitz for their comments on drafts of this Article.
' A survey of Jewish law courses and seminars at American law schools published
in February, 1994, reported 33 courses at 28 institutions. Institute of Jewish Law, Touro
College Jacob D. Fuchsberg Law Center, JENWISH L. REP., Feb. 1994, at 27-28. The
course title was "Jewish Law" or "Introduction to Jewish Law" at 15 schools and
ranged from "Talmudic Legal Studies" to "Judaic Sources of American Law" at other
institutions. Previous surveys reported 17 courses at 15 schools in 1989, Institute of
Jewish Law, Touro College Jacob D. Fuchsberg Law Center, NEwSLETrER, June 1989,
at 9, and 21 courses at 26 schools in 1991. Institute of Jewish Law, Touro College
Jacob D. Fuchsberg Law Center, JEWISH L. REP., June 1991, at 15-16. It is likely that
a small number of additional courses not mentioned in the surveys were also offered.
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issue. In such cases, students often find a comparative approach useful to
help them develop answers of their own, and some students want to study
the answers provided by the great religious traditions as part of this
process. In this respect, Jewish law, which has something to say on each
of these questions, can have a profound impact on the education of new
lawyers in the modem world.
The appearance in print of classroom teaching materials on Jewish
law suitable for use in American law schools has not kept pace with the
proliferation of courses. For the most part, professors assemble their own
teaching materials from primary and secondary sources available in
English. In part, this reflects the unique backgrounds, interests, and ap-
proaches each professor brings to this complex and fascinating subject
But it also reflects the fact that to date no casebook on Jewish law has
appeared in print although at least two are currently being prepared for
publication.
A Jewish law casebook is possible. Jewish law has in its responsa
literature an extensive record of its case law as applied from late antiqui-
ty until the present day.3 In modem times, additional case law is devel-
oping in Israel. Matters of personal status, governed by religious law, are
litigated in rabbinical courts that publish their decisions - majority opin-
ions as well as dissents.4 In addition, under the Foundations of Law Act
(1980),' nonrabbinical judges are directed to consult certain aspects of
Jewish law - those parts of it that correspond to "the principles of free-
dom, justice, equity and peace of Israel's heritage" - when they find a
gap in Israeli statutes and case law. Under the Act, references to Jewish
law in Israeli judicial opinions are likely to increase as Israeli judges
become more familiar with its principles and with their obligation to
2 For examples of two contrasting approaches, compare AARON M. SCHREIBER,
JEWISH LAW AND DECISION-MAKING: A STUDY THROUGH TIME (1979), with ELLIOT
DORFF & ARTHUR RosETT, A LIVING TREE: THE ROOTS AND GROWTH OF JEWISH
LAW (1988). These two excellent volumes, written by law professors, contain materials
that originated in connection with their courses at Temple University and the University
of California at Los Angeles, respectively. A LIVING TREE is still in print and available
for adoption by professors at other law schools.
3 See SOLOMON FREEHOF, THE RESPONSA LITERATURE (1955); see also 1-4 JACOB
BAZAK & STEPHEN M. PASSAMANECK, JEWISH LAW AND JEWISH LIFE: SELECTED
RABBINIC RESPONSA (1977). It has been estimated that the number of published
responsa is 300,000. Menachem Elon, The Legal System of Jewish Law, 17 N.Y.U. J.
INT'L L. & POL. 221, 231 (1985).
' These decisions may be found in the multi-volume reporter entitled "Piske-din
Bate Ha-Din Ha-Rabaniyim" (Decisions of the Rabbinical Courts) [hereinafter P.D.R.].
' Foundations of Law, 5740-1980, 34 LAWS OF THE STATE OF ISRAEL 181 (Minis-
try of Justice trans., 1980).
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consult it to fill lacunae in the law.6
While the problems involved in selecting, translating, annotating, and
arranging these materials into a coherent casebook (or casebooks) to meet
the needs of a diverse audience of American law school professors and
students are vast, the effort is worthwhile. In the first place, the availabil-
ity of a casebook will reduce barriers to entry into the field. First-time
teachers could adopt the casebook rather than embark upon the arduous
task of assembling their own materials as a precondition to teaching the
course. Second, a casebook may facilitate the approval of new Jewish law
courses at schools where the subject has not previously been taught. With
a casebook, a proposed Jewish law course would resemble most other law
school offerings and could even be taught to some extent in the tradition-
al Socratic way. Finally, while no single casebook will ever be acceptable
to all professors and some will always prefer to use their own materials,
even they might wish to assign to their students selected cases or units of
instruction from the casebook.
What should a chapter in a Jewish law casebook look like? The
present effort is one attempt to answer that question. The chapter is
divided into six sections:
1. Introduction - The chapter begins with a brief, general introduc-
tion to the topic, fraud on the surviving spouse's share.
2. The principal case - A decision of the Israeli Supreme Court7
is presented in English translation with a minimum of footnoting and
commentary. The aim is to make the students' initial encounter with the
material as free from editorial imposition as possible. It is hoped that the
students will take this opportunity to wrestle with the material on their
own and thus become engaged in the issues raised by the case before
they have the benefit of the author's views.
3. Notes - A sequence of detailed notes follows the case. Their aim
is to deepen the students' understanding of the principles of Jewish law
raised in the principal case and to compare and contrast them with
analogous principles derived from the common law and American and
Israeli statutes and cases. The notes encourage the students to study the
legal rules in light of the values they embody and the instrumental social
policies they foster. The notes also expand the coverage of Jewish law by
addressing related legal principles that were not raised in the principal
case. For example, while Shefi treats the widow's right to receive mainte-
6 For a collection of references to Jewish law in Israeli court decisions from 1948-
1987, see 1-2 NAHUM RAKOVER, MODERN APPUCATIONS OF JEWISH LAW (1992).
' The case presented in this sample chapter is Shefi v. Shpitz, (1955) 9 P.D. 1077.
See infra, § II.
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nance from the estate, the notes explore also the widow's related right to
continue to reside in her husband's residence.
For students who have not taken a course in the substantive area of
law under consideration, the notes are designed to serve as an introduc-
tion to the law of decedent's estates; for students who have completed a
course in the topic, the notes should serve as a refresher. These features
of the ideal Jewish law course - its comparative treatment of the materi-
als, its coverage of many topics in a single course that are more com-
monly treated in separate courses, and its ability to function as a review
for many subjects the students may have taken previously - are part of
what attracts students to Jewish law courses in the first place.
4. Words and Phrases - Important concepts of Jewish law men-
tioned in the principal case but not central to its theme and hence only
briefly discussed are singled out in this section for more extensive
treatment. For each concept, the section presents an excerpt from the
work of a noted authority who has researched the topic and written about
it, exposing the students to a variety of authors and perspectives.
5. Questions and problems - Questions raise broad issues both for
the students to ponder in their reading and also for the instructor to use
as a guide for classroom discussion if he or she wishes to do so. Prob-
lems pose the actual fact patterns of cases reported either in the responsa
literature or rabbinical court decisions without, however, stating the con-
clusions reached. Instead, the students are asked how they would decide
the cases based on the principles they have just studied.
6. For further reference - A list of books and articles is provided
to assist students who have selected this topic for research, since most
Jewish law courses are offered as seminars and it is more than likely that
students will be asked to submit a research paper as a requirement of the
course.
In rendering the material suitable for use in American law school
courses, several factors have governed. The use of Hebrew terms is kept
to a minimum. Wherever primary sources are cited, the citations refer to
English translations if they are available. Full names and dates are given
for the Hebrew legal authorities who will be mostly unfamiliar to the
students. The list of works for future reference concentrates on articles
and books in English.
Teachers of Jewish law are invited to assign the chapter to their
students if they wish to teach a unit on the inheritance rights of spouses.
It is hoped that this chapter will be just the first in a series of model
chapters to appear in print. In this manner, a "de facto" Jewish law
casebook may appear, chapter by chapter, in the not too distant future.
[Vol. 28:101
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Fraud on the Surviving Spouse in
Jewish and American Law:
A Model Chapter for a Jewish Law
Casebook*
I. Introduction
"All happy families are like one another; each
unhappy family is unhappy in its own way."8
Granting the kernel of truth in Tolstoy's observation, many unhappy
families display a similar pattern of attempts to deprive a surviving
spouse of access to a deceased partner's property. Under both Jewish and
American law there are cases in which one spouse, contemplating death
and on unfriendly terms with the other, has attempted to insulate assets
from the survivor by transferring them to a third party before death. As
we shall see, in the Jewish cases, the purpose is to deplete the husband's
estate so that his heirs will not be obligated to support his widow for her
life, while in the American cases, the aim is to reduce the estate in order
to deprive the surviving spouse of a set share of the decedent's assets by
way of inheritance. But in all of the cases, the transferor appears to be
acting with one axiomatic principle in mind: "If he died possessed of
nothing, the widow, of course, would receive nothing."9
Both legal systems permit married individuals to make effective gifts
of assets to third parties and in theory one could defeat a spouse's
expectations by giving away all of one's property during life. But most
people are reluctant to part with all of their wealth and pauperize them-
* © Jeffrey I. Roth, 1995.
s LEo TOLSTOY, ANNA KARENNA 17 (David Magarshack trans., 1961).
9 In re Shupack's Will, 136 N.E.2d 513, 515 (N.Y. 1956).
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selves in the process. This leads to common forms of evasion, transfers
of property that on the surface appear to be absolute gifts but in reality
leave the donor entitled to the benefits of the property. In some cases, the
donor gives away assets with strings attached so that the donor remains
in control in substance if not in form; in other cases the donor engages
in a sham transfer that merely appears on its surface to vest ownership in
another while the benefits of the property continue to flow back to the
donor until death. How should such transfers be treated in light of legal
principles that require an economic benefit to flow to the survivor at the
death of a spouse? Consider the following materials.
FRAUD ON THE SURVIVING SPOUSE
II.
SHEFI ET AL. V. SHPrIZ
Supreme Court of Israel
(1955) 9 P.D. 107710
GOITEIN, SUSSMAN, AND BERINSON, Justices.
Goitein, J. The first appellant, Haim Shefi, is the son of the dece-
dent, Yehiel Shpitz, whose estate is the second appellant. The respondent
is the decedent's widow and stepmother of the first appellant. Mr. Shefi
is the decedent's only child and was born to him from a prior marriage.
The respondent married the decedent on November 20, 1941. The
match did not fare well. The respondent filed a claim for maintenance
against her husband in a rabbinic court and was awarded the sum of 50
Israeli pounds per month for expenses.
Some twelve years after the second marriage, Mr. Shpitz died. The
decedent left no assets because, some three years prior to his death, he
had made a gift of all of his property to his son, Mr. Shefi. Following
her husband's death, the widow sought maintenance from the estate and
from her stepson but the latter refused. He claimed, among other things,
first, that the estate lacked any assets from which the widow could collect
support and second, that he is not under any obligation to maintain her
from his private property.
No one disputes the right of the widow to be maintained out of
property that passes by inheritance. It is also clear that the right does not
become effective if the heirs receive nothing by way of inheritance.
Therefore the primary question we must resolve concerns the property the
father purported to transfer to his son inter vivos. Should it be considered
as property acquired by the son during the father's lifetime or should it
be considered an inheritance from which the widow is entitled to collect
maintenance?
To begin with, if the assets had been transferred as an absolute gift,
no one could argue that they had been received as an inheritance since
10 Translation by the author. Notes 11-25 were added to the opinion for purposes
of this Article.
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the assets were already registered in the son's name during the father's
lifetime. Even so, the District Court decided in its careful and instructive
opinion that despite the registration, the property did not pass to the son
in the father's lifetime since the father's purpose in making the transfer
was to conceal his assets and thus prevent his widow from collecting
maintenance from them. Under Jewish law, such a transfer is not effective
to transfer title from the father to the son. The District Court found that
the transfer was a sham since the rights to the property remained in the
father until death. Accordingly what the father purported to do, namely,
to place the property beyond the widow's reach, is not effective under
Jewish law and does not prevent her from collecting support from the
property that was ostensibly transferred to the son. As a result the District
Court ordered the son together with the estate to pay the widow support
from the assets the father transferred to the son during his life. This
appeal followed.
The attorney for the appellants directed most of his arguments
against the court's finding that the transfer was a sham. We turn then to
the grounds upon which the learned judge established that the gift was
illusory. The court found:
1. Despite the fact that the transfer was recorded as a sale without
consideration, the decedent and his son had agreed at the time of the
transfer that the former would enjoy the income for life. Although all of
the details of the agreement were not proven, the learned judge concluded
that the father's intention was not to transfer all the property to his son
as an absolute gift but rather to leave to the son at his death whatever
property might be left, the father having enjoyed the fruits thereof during
his life.
2. The father continued to live in one of the buildings.
3. The father continued to collect rent from the tenants after transfer-
ring the property to his son.
4. The son obligated himself to pay 600 Israeli pounds to various
individuals and signed notes which were deposited in escrow with an
attorney.
5. It was the son who paid the respondent her support pursuant to
the rabbinic court decrees entered during the father's life.
6. The father and son concealed the transfer from the respondent
until it was revealed to her by chance some three months prior to the
father's death.
From these findings the judge concluded that the entire purpose of
[Vol. 28:101
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the transfer was only to conceal assets from the widow so she would be
unable to collect maintenance from them. Although the appellants'
attorney attacked every finding, in my opinion there is within the evi-
dence sufficient factual basis to justify the findings and to reach the con-
clusion the learned judge reached ...
In light of the findings and the conclusion, it is incumbent upon us
to know what rule of Jewish law applies to the case before us.
In 1938, during the mandatory period, it was decided in Palestine by
the Special Tribunal (Spec. Trib. 1/28; (1920-33), P.L.R. Vol. 1, p. 395,
[2]) that the obligation of the husband to support his wife flows from the
marriage and that this obligation continues as a lien upon the husband's
estate after his death until the marriage contract is paid ....
After the creation of the State of Israel, the Supreme Court also had
occasion to make known its views concerning the duty to maintain a
widow. Justice Assaf wrote as follows in C.A. 100/49 Miller v. Miller
(1951) 5 P.D. 1301:
In Maimonides" and the Shulhan Arukh,"2 the law is decided that
"even when an individual commands at the hour of death not to support
his widow from the assets of his estate, he is paid no heed." (Id. at
1313)....
The liability to maintain the widow is not a new duty that is
created upon the husband's death, and it cannot be compared to the
heir's right to succeed to the decedent's property. Rather it is a duty
that is created with the marriage and at the time of the marriage al-
though it does not accrue until the husband's death. This is explicit in
Shulhan Arukh, Even ha-Ezer 69:
When a man marries a woman he becomes obligated to her for ten
matters ... [including] to be supported by his estate and to reside in
his house after his death so long as she remains a widow ....
Rabbi Moses ben Maimon, 1135-1204, author of a code of Jewish law entitled
Mishneh Torah.
12 Code of Jewish law written by Rabbi Joseph Caro, 1488-1575.
z When a man marries a woman, he undertakes 10 obligations and receives 4
entitlements:
The obligations are: (a) to provide her with sustenance or maintenance; (b) to supply
her clothing and lodging; (c) to cohabit with her;, (d) to provide the ketubbah (i.e., the
sum fixed for the wife by law); (e) to procure medical attention and care during her
illness; (f) to ransom her if she be taken captive; (g) to provide suitable burial upon
her death; (h) to provide for her support after his death and ensure her right to live in
his house as long as she remains a widow; (i) to provide for the support of the
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Thus it is the marriage that creates the duty to maintain the
widow, and the duty attaches at the time of the marriage although it is
not discharged until the husband's death. This is similar to the duty to
pay the essential ketubah [marriage contract] which attaches at the
moment of marriage but the time of payment does not accrue until the
wife is divorced or widowed. It follows that if the husband wishes to be
free of the duty to support his widow, he must enter a stipulation to this
effect at the time of the marriage.
One may regard the widow's support as a sort of continuation of
the support she received while the husband was living. Not a moment
in time separates them. Now if one should inquire why Maimonides and
Shulhan Arukh enumerate them separately as if they were separate and
distinct duties, the answer would be that for Maimonides, the wife's
support is a duty derived from the Torah'4 while the widow's mainte-
nance is a duty derived from rabbinic law and a condition of the
ketubah. Therefore the authorities distinguish between them .... But it
is clear that the obligation to support the widow is not derived from the
ketubah but from the marriage itself. (Id. at 1314.)
The halakhah concerning the hiding of assets has two facets. It
matters whether the person who engages in the concealing is the husband
or the wife. The rule differs in accordance with the identity of the party
who conceals.
First there is the case of a woman about to remarry who does not
want her prospective husband to have the benefit of her property. For this
reason, she deeds her property either to her children by a prior marriage
or to a third party. The deed is known as a "deed of concealment."' 5
daughters of the marriage from his estate after his death, until they become be-
trothed ... or reach the age of maturity; and (j) to provide that the sons of the
marriage shall inherit their mother's ketubbah, in addition to their rightful portion of the
estate of their father shared with his sons by others wives. The husband's rights are
those entitling him: (a) to the benefit of the wife's handiwork; (b) to her chance gains
or finds; (c) to the usufruct of her property; and (d) to inherit her estate.
Ben-Zion Schereschewsky, Husband and Wife, in THE PRINCIPLES OF JEWISH LAW 379-
80 (Menachem Elon ed., 1975).
" According to Maimonides, three of the 10 obligations are imposed by Biblical
law - the wife's maintenance, clothing and cohabitation. The remaining seven are
imposed by rabbinic law. 4 MAIMONIDES, MISHNEH TORAH: THE BOOK OF WOMEN,
Laws of Marriage 18:2 (Isaac Klein trans., 1972) [hereinafter Laws of Marriage]. For
a discussion of the distinction in Jewish law between Biblical laws (Heb. de-oraita) and
rabbinic laws (Heb. de-rabbanan), see Menachem Elon, De-Oraita and De-Rabbanan,
in THE PRINCIPLES OF JEWISH LAW 9, 9-10 (Menachem Elon ed., 1975).
"5 Heb. shetar mabrakhat. For the translation "deed of concealment," see 2 NAHUM
RAKOVER, MODERN APPLICATIONS OF JEWISH LAW 744 (1992).
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Maimonides summarizes the law that pertains to it as follows:
If a woman about to be married deeds all her property either to
her son or to a stranger, then marries and thereafter is divorced or
widowed, the law is that her gift is not valid because it is the gift of a
mabrahat, i.e., she has deeded all her property only for the purpose of
excluding her husband from it so that he may not inherit it and so that
it be returned to her when she needs it.
Therefore if she dies while the husband is still alive the donee
acquires title to everything.'
6
This rule has its source in the Talmud, Ketubot 78b-79a. It relates
the case of a woman who before her second marriage deeded all her
property to her daughter. Later she divorced and sought to recover the
property from her daughter who refused. When the parties appeared
before Ray Nahman,"7 he tore the deed of gift and announced that the
gift was void, basing his action on the presumption that a person will not
rid himself of [all] his property and give it to another. The mother's pur-
pose in transferring the property to her daughter was not to vest title in
the daughter but to conceal it from her prospective husband so that he
would not have the benefit of it. The donee did not acquire a vested right
to the property since the donor lacked the donative intent to make an
absolute gift to her, even though the transaction appeared from the deed
to be an absolute gift.
The second aspect of the rule involves the case of a man about to
remarry who wishes to insulate his assets from his future wife's claim for
her ketubah or maintenance. The obstacles to accomplishing this - if it
be possible at all - are obvious from what we stated earlier, citing
Judge Assaf, for the rule is that a husband has a duty to support his wife
from the instant of marriage, that this duty continues as a charge on his
assets upon his death, and that only a stipulation made at the time of the
marriage can release him from the duty. Further, there is no difference
between a first or second wife.
Halakhic authorities disputed over the' centuries whether a husband
may conceal assets from his wife by transferring them to a stranger and
thus prevent her from collecting maintenance or her ketubah. At present,
16 5 MAIMONIDEs, MIsHNEH TORAH: BOOK OF ACQuIsMON, Laws of Original
Acquisition and Gifts 6:12 (Isaac Klein trans. 1951) [hereinafter Laws of Original Ac-
quisition and Gifts]. The paragraph in Mishneh Torah ends with the following state-
ment "But if she reserves anything for herself, even movables, her gift is valid, so
that even if she becomes divorced she cannot retract." Id.
"7 A scholar of Jewish law who lived in Babylonia in the 4th century C.E. (4th
century A.D.).
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however, the law is clearly established that he cannot.
The minority position is represented by the view of Rabbenu Tam s
who holds that a person can conceal property from his wife by
transferring it to a third party. The matter is briefly stated in Tosafot 9
on Tractate Ketubot 79 as follows:
A case of a deed of concealment came before Rabbenu Tam. A person
wanted to borrow money but not to create a lien in favor of the creditor
nor, by way of deed of concealment, to charge his property for his
wife's ketubah. Rabbenu Tam ruled that the deed was valid.
The majority took the contrary position in light of the principle that
"where one endeavors to evade a rabbinic rule by fraud or contrivance,
let alone to steal from a neighbor, it is incumbent upon the rabbinic sages
of the generation to frustrate his intention even though there is no
evidence but only well-proven legal assumptions." (Responsa of the
Rosh," No. 78:3.) This principle found clear expression in Shulhan
Arukh, Hoshen ha-Mishpat 99:6:
When an individual is indebted to his neighbor and gives all he has to
others to evade the debt, his fraud will not succeed and his creditor may
collect the debt ... from the donee.
Similarly, in the responsa of the Rosh:
Where one purchases land, directing that title be placed in his brother
rather than in himself, and the deed is drawn in the brother's name to
evade the wife's lien, my teacher Rabbi Meir ruled that the wife may
collect from the property. Since the purchaser fraudulently intended to
evade a rabbinical rule, his stratagem will not avail him. (Responsa of
the Rosh, No. 78:1.)
The purpose of the rule was neither to negate the rights of owners
to deal with their property as they pleased nor to interfere in the ordinary
conduct of their affairs. If an owner sincerely wishes to raise cash from
his immovable property or to give property as a gift to another, nothing
prevents him from doing so. But if the transactions are undertaken with
a fraudulent intent to deny creditors' rights, the court will intervene to
permit a creditor or a wife to secure their due. They will receive payment
from the "transferred" property and no attention will be paid to the
18 Rabbi Jacob ben Meir (1100-1171), grandson of Rashi.
,9 A collection of glosses on the Talmud containing the views of Jewish scholars
active in Franco-Germany in the 12th century.
o Rabbi Asher ben Jehiel, 1250-1327.
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transactions undertaken by the owner.
The halakhah in this area may be summarized as follows:
A. If the intent of the donor was to vest absolute ownership in the
donee and the donor lacked any intent to defraud, the transfer is valid
and effective even though the consequence is to deny the rights of
creditors, the wife among them.
B. If the donor's intent was indeed to vest absolute ownership in the
donee but, along with this intention, he also had the fraudulent intention
to deny creditors' rights, then if this additional intention is not apparent
from the transaction - i.e., it is not a legal assumption supported by
proo ' - then the additional intention has only the weight of an unex-
pressed thought' which, it is commonly known, does not have the
power to nullify an act of transfer.
C. If, however, the intention to defraud is discernible in the transac-
tion and is a legal assumption supported by proof, then even though the
donor also had true donative intent to vest absolute title in the donee, the
transfer will not take effect because the intention to defraud has become
a legal assumption supported by proof....
A number of halakhic authorities contend that a distinction must be
made between a gift to children and a gift to a stranger. Thus
Maharamu wrote:
Even where a gift supersedes the ketubah or maintenance, a gift an
individual makes to a child or heir, even while in good health, does
not.... In the final analysis a gift to one's heirs is the same as an
inheritance.. . and it follows that such a gift will not be more effective
than an inheritance ordained by the Torah to override the ketubah and
the duty to maintain a widow. (Cited in Yam Shel Shlomo,24 Ketubot
4:28.)
Having summarized the halakhah pertaining to the case, let us see
how the learned judge below decided.... He correctly emphasized the
difference between a transfer to one's child and a transfer to a stranger.
The rule that a widow may not collect maintenance from property trans-
ferred to a stranger is based on reasons of social policy,' as the
2 "Legal assumption supported by proof," Heb. umdana de'mukhah. See Words and
Phrases, § IV, infra.
' "Unexpressed thought," Heb. devarim shebelev. See Words and Phrases, § IV,
infra.
Rabbi Meir ben Baruch of Rothenburg, 1220-1293.
24 Talmudic commentary by Rabbi Solomon Luria, 1510-1573.
Heb. mipne tikkun olam. See Words and Phrases, § IV, infra.
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Mishnah states (Gittin 5:3): "We do not collect . . . support for wife and
daughters from mortgaged property for reasons of social policy. .. "
He then asks, "Does she also not collect in a case where the transfer
was intended to defeat her right to maintenance and it was made fraudu-
lently or in a sham transaction?" After investigating the rule in the
sources he writes:
Among the legal assumptions which the Rosh enumerates according to
the Talmud, one answers our case, and that is we assume a person will
not give away all of his wealth to others and reduce himself to begging
at doorsteps. If a person transfers all of his property, even to his son,
the legal assumption is that his intention was fraudulent concealment
rather than an effective transfer. When a matter of an alleged conceal-
ment arises (according to Ketubot 79b), it appears that even if the
transferor left himself something although very little, the legal assump-
tion remains that his intention was concealment .... This assumption
seems to me consistent with the rules of circumstantial evidence in
modem law.
The judge turned to the facts cited previously and reached the necessary
conclusion that determines the outcome of this appeal: there was here an
intent to defraud and conceal assets and the gift was not absolute.
I believe the judge was correct and reached the only possible conclu-
sion permitted by the facts cited above, namely, that the father did not
succeed in transferring the property absolutely to his son during his
lifetime and that the son did not receive an absolute gift. Although civil
law may view the son as having obtained the property from his father as
an inter vivos gift, under Jewish law the property is deemed to have
passed by inheritance, subject to the charge for the widow's maintenance
and the duty to permit her to continue to reside in the house where she
lived with her husband during his life.
In light of what was said above, we dismiss the appeal and affirm
the judgment of the District Court ....
III. Notes
1. How important was the deceased husband's intent to the outcome in
Shefi v. Shpitz? On the one hand, it appears to be the crucial factor, for
it was Mr. Shpitz's intent to conceal assets from his wife that rendered
the lifetime gift to his son a fraud, permitting the widow to claim her
maintenance. On the other hand, the husband's purely subjective intention,
in the sense of a "mental reservation" that may have accompanied the
gift, cannot affect the transaction, constituting nothing more than "words
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in the heart." What in the end turns out to be crucial for the widow's
recovery are the outward manifestations of the donor's intent - the
external indicia that permit the court to infer that the husband intended
not an absolute transfer but the concealment of assets. After all, intention
is a state of mind. How can anyone know what another person's inten-
tions were? The best evidence would be truthful testimony directly from
the actor. Putting aside questions of mixed motivations and people who
are not trutIful even to themselves, such testimony is, of course, not
available where the actor is not living. A written memorandum of inten-
tion would be the next best evidence but is unlikely to exist, especially
where the intention was indeed to defraud. This leaves the fact finder
with the necessity of drawing inferences about the actor's intentions from
directly observable evidence, such as the characteristics of the transaction
in which he engaged. In Shefi, the court pointed to these:
(1) The father retained the income from the transferred assets and
collected rent from tenants.
(2) The father continued to reside in one of the buildings.
(3) The son undertook to defray some of the father's debts in
consideration of the gift and paid his stepmother's support
under a court order entered against the father.
(4) The parties concealed the transfer of assets from Mrs. Shpitz
who discovered it by chance just three months prior to her
husband's death.
In Jewish law, the "legal assumption" (Heb. umdana)27 is that a person
will not give away all of his assets and impoverish himself. The factors
just mentioned make the assumption a proven assumption (Heb. umdana
de'mukhah), showing the donor did not intend to divest himself of the
property in favor of his son by gift but, rather, he sought to insulate the
assets from his widow's claim while retaining the benefits of the property
until death when the property would, in substance if not in form, pass to
the son.
2. It has been suggested that it is useful in this area of the law to
distinguish between "motive" and "intention." '8 Motive is the motivation
or incentive that impels an individual to act. Intention connotes the
individual's purpose or purposes which he deliberately sets out to accom-
26 Heb. devarim she-be-lev. See Words and Phrases, § IV infra.
See Words and Phrases, § IV, infra.
For a discussion of this point, see WILLIAM D. MACDONALD, FRAUD ON THE
WiDow's SHARE 98-119 (1960).
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plish by acting. 9 To fully understand the distinction, consider the fol-
lowing case: X and Y are husband and wife and their relationship is
good. X has a net worth of $50,000. X has an indigent friend, Z, who is
in need of medical treatment that costs $50,000. X decides to make a gift
of all of his assets to Z for his medical treatment. The incentive for the
gift, what motivates X's action is, of course, Z's medical condition.
Depriving Y of her marital rights is not what impels X to act. But in
making the gift of his assets to Z, which X does deliberately, he must
necessarily and at the same time intend to deprive his wife of those
assets, just as he deliberately intends to deprive himself, his heirs, and his
creditors. Although removing his assets from their reach is not what
motivates the gift to Z, it is a definite consequence of X's deliberate act.
In undertaking to make the gift, X cannot possibly be unaware of the
cost to himself, his wife, his heirs, and his creditors.
Return to Justice Goitein's summary of Jewish law on this point in
the principal case where he writes:
If the intent (Heb. kavanah) of the donor was to vest absolute
ownership in the donee and the donor lacked any intent to defraud, the
transfer is valid and effective even though the consequence is to deny
the rights of creditors, the wife among them.
In which of the two senses mentioned above does Justice Goitein use the
word "intent"? He must mean motivation, because there can never be a
case of an absolute transfer of assets by a married man to a stranger in
which the transferor "lacks any intent" (in the second sense of "acting
purposefully and deliberately") to deprive his spouse of the transferred
assets.
3. Under Jewish law, as explained in the principal case, the widow's right
to maintenance from her husband's estate attaches at the time of mar-
riage, although the obligation to pay it does not accrue until the moment
of the husband's death. The same was true under English common law
with regard to dower - the widow's right to a life estate in one-third of
her husband's lands. Inchoate dower rights arose by operation of law at
the moment of marriage. At the husband's death, when inchoate dower
became consummate, one-third of the husband's land was set off to the
widow for her life either by court order or by agreement with his heir."
Inchoate dower inhibited free transfers of land since the wife's
release of her dower was required for the husband to make an effective
29 Id. at 103.
3o ROGER A. CUNNINGHAM ET AL., THE LAW OF PROPERTY 74-77 (1984).
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sale to a third party.3 ' In part to remedy this situation, and also in
recognition of the fact that an increasing proportion of wealth in modem
society consists of property other than land, most American states enacted
statutes that replace dower with elective share rights. 2 The statutes
provide a surviving spouse, husband or wife, with a right to take a share
of the decedent's estate, often one-third or one-half of real and personal
property, unless the decedent made an equivalent or greater provision for
the survivor by will.33 If a spouse dies without a will (intestate), the
surviving spouse is an heir along with children and in some cases parents
and will inherit under the state statute of intestate succession.34 Unlike
dower, in American common law states today the inheritance rights of
spouses attach only at the moment of death and do not encumber proper-
ty while the spouse is living.
Thus, it is possible to draw three contrasts regarding the position of
a widow under Jewish and American law. First, the widow is not an heir
of her husband under Jewish law but she is an heir under American law.
Second, the widow is entitled to maintenance from her husband's estate
under Jewish law but not under American law. Third, the widow's rights
under Jewish law attach to the husband's property at the moment of
marriage while her rights to an elective share under American statutes do
not arise until the husband's death.
Prof. Shilo has summarized the widow's position under Jewish law
as follows:
3, Id. at 80.
32 In nine states (Arizona, California, Idaho, Louisiana, Nevada, New Mexico, Texas,
Washington, and Wisconsin), community property principles govern the spouses'
inheritance rights. See JESSE DUKEMINIER & STANLEY M. JOHANSON, WILLS, TRUSTS
AND ESTATES 474, 476 (5th ed. 1995).
" For representative statutes, see, e.g., UNIFORM PROBATE CODE, art. II, part 2
(1991) (elective share of surviving spouse), adopted in approximately half of the states,
and NEW YORK ESTATES, POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 5-1.1-A (McKinney 1981 &
Supp. 1995) (giving a right of election to the surviving spouse). Both statutes, to
prevent disinheritance by lifetime transfers, provide that the value of certain assets that
were transferred during the decedent's lifetime must be taken into account for purposes
of computing the amount that the surviving spouse is entitled to receive as his or her
elective share. UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-205 (listing the decedent's non-probate transfers
that are included in the value of his or her augmented estate) and N.Y. EST., POWERS
& TRUSTS LAW § 5-1.1-A(b) (treating enumerated inter vivos dispositions as testamenta-
ry substitutes for the purpose of election by the surviving spouse.)
14 See, e.g., UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-102 (describing the surviving spouse's share
when the decedent died intestate); N.Y. EST., POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 4-1.1
(describing the descent and distribution of an intestate decedent's estate.).
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The wife is not a legal heir to her husband's estate (BB 8:1) [Bava
Bathra, a Talmudic tractate] but has a number of rights which afford
her a share therein and ensure provision for her sustenance and essential
needs until her death or remarriage. The widow receives from the estate
her husband's ketubbah obligations, the dowry increment, and her own
property brought into the marriage and she is further entitled to mainte-
nance from the husband's estate until her death or remarriage. 5
4. Jewish law treats the inheritance rights of husbands and wives differ-
ently. As noted, a husband inherits his wife's estate but not the reverse,
while the widow is entitled to support from her husband's estate but not
the reverse. Further, as discussed in the principal case, a wife can utilize
a "deed of concealment" to defeat her husband's inheritance rights while,
according to the majority of authorities, a husband cannot execute such a
deed to defeat his widow's right to support.
Widows and widowers were also treated differently under the com-
mon law regime of dower and curtesy.36 By contrast, modem U.S. stat-
utes providing for intestate succession and elective share afford equal
rights for each surviving spouse without regard to gender. Where this is
not the case, the statute is subject to judicial scrutiny under state and
federal constitutional guarantees of equal protection of the laws.37
In part to eliminate the disparity of inheritance rights between
husbands and wives under Jewish law, the Israeli Knesset in 1965 enacted
the Succession Law.3" Deputy Attorney General Uri Yadin of Israel has
written of the statute:
One of the outstanding trends or features of the Succession Law is
3 Shmuel Shilo, Succession, in THE PRINCIPLES OF JEWISH LAW 447, 449
(Menachem Elon ed., 1975).
36 On dower, see textual discussion supra, Note 3. Curtesy was the husband's right
at common law to a life estate in all of his wife's lands where issue had been born
to the marriage. CUNNINGHAM, supra note 30, at 73-74.
3 See e.g., Hall v. McBride, 416 So.2d 986 (Ala. 1982), where the court struck
down a state statute providing a forced share for widows only. It held that the
surviving spouse's gender could not be used as a reliable proxy for need. There were
indigent widowers who needed assets from their wive's estates as well as wealthy
widows who did not need to inherit anything from their husband's estates. In the
court's view, a statute premised on the belief that widows would tend to need more
economic assistance than widowers was based on a paternalistic view of women as
homemakers and was at odds with the contemporary reality of large numbers of women
in the workforce.
" Succession Law, 5725-1965, 19 LAWS OF THE STATE OF ISRAEL 58 (Ministry of
Justice trans., 1980) [hereinafter Succession Law].
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the equality among members of the family. Rights of the widow and
widower are identical for inheritance purposes as well as for mainte-
nance out of the estate.39
Shefi v. Shpitz was decided before the Succession Law was enacted,
when inheritance rights in Israel were a matter of personal status gov-
erned by the parties' religious law. Section 155 of the Succession Law'
provides that parties may consent in writing to have their inheritance
rights determined in their religious court under the religious law that
applies to them. Thus Jewish law, including the principles described in
Shefi, remains available in Israel today to determine inheritance rights
upon consent of the parties involved.4' The Succession Law provides,
however, that if one of the parties is a minor or legally incompetent, his
39 Ui Yadin, The Succession Law as Part of Israeli Civil Law Legislation, 1 TEL
Aviv UNIVERsrrY STUDIES IN LAW 36, 42 (1975) [hereinafter Yadin, The Succession
Law as Part of Israeli Civil Law Legislation]; see also Uri Yadin, The Law of
Succession and Other Steps Towards A Civil Code, in STUDIES IN ISRAEL LEGISLATIVE
PROBLEMS 104, 107 (Guido Tedeschi & Uri Yadin eds., 1966).
o Succession Law, supra note 38, at 83-84.
4, For rabbinical court cases applying Jewish law to determine inheritance rights
upon the parties' consent under § 155(a) of the Succession Law, see, e.g., A. v. B.
and C., Case No. 7586/29, 9 P.D.R. 115 (5729) (adjusting inheritance between son and
daughter where son was their father's sole heir under Jewish law but certain assets of
the decedent were registered in the daughter's name or in her possession); B. and C.
v. A., Appeal No. 117/39, 11 P.D.R. 289 (5739) (rejecting appeal of decedent's widow
to revoke her consent to rabbinical court jurisdiction upon learning she would inherit
nothing from deceased husband's estate); A. v. B., Case No. 12170/39, 12 P.D.R. 45
(5739) (granting widow support from heirs where she was estranged from their
deceased father but not divorced); A. v. B., Appeal No 179/42, 13 P.D.R. 199 (5742)
(dividing decedent's property between his bother, as sole heir under Jewish law, and his
widow, where decedent during his life had executed a deed of gift conveying all of his
property to her); and Rotar v. Public Administrator, Case No. 12571/44, 13 P.D.R. 319
(5744) (holding rabbinical court may accept jurisdiction under § 155(a) where all
known heirs have consented although no one can prove conclusively, in view of the
Holocaust, whether additional heirs of the decedent may be living).
In Meshullam v. Rabbinical Court of Appeals, 45 P.D. 594 (1991), the Israeli
Supreme Court transferred an inheritance matter from rabbinical court to the Israeli
district court upon application of the decedent's reputed spouse, to whom he was never
married. The decedent's three children had consented to the application of Jewish law
but the reputed spouse objected. The rabbinical court found her consent was not
necessary because, on the facts presented, she was not an heir under Jewish law. The
Supreme Court held that the question of who is an heir for purposes of the consent
required under § 155(a) should be decided by the Israeli district court. Justice Elon
dissented, arguing that the court in which the issue of jurisdiction was raised, in this
case the rabbinical court, should decide the matter.
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inheritance rights, as determined under religious law, may not be less than
they would be under the Succession Law.42
5. One consequence of the shift from dower to elective share in American
common law states was to render a married individual's property freely
transferable during life. This gave each spouse the potential ability to
defeat the other's elective share rights through lifetime gifts, a problem
identical to the situation the court confronted in Shefi. When the validity
of such gifts was challenged after the donor's death by the surviving
spouse who was disinherited, most American courts concluded that a test
based on the transferor's purely subjective intent was unworkable. The
leading American case, Newman v. Dore,43 stated the reasons as follows:
Motive or intent is an unsatisfactory test of the validity of a
transfer of property. In most jurisdictions it has been rejected, sometimes
for the reason that it would cast doubt upon the validity of all transfers
made by a married man, outside of the regular course of business;
sometimes because it is difficult to find a satisfactory logical foundation
for it."
In Newman, the husband, who was estranged from his wife, trans-
ferred all of his assets to a trust just prior to his death. It was clear that
his purpose was to deprive his widow of her statutory share in favor of
the trust beneficiaries. But his intention was not what invalidated the trust
against the widow's claim to elective share. Instead, the court looked to
the control over the property that the husband retained. He had retained
full control over the trustees and could direct their actions in writing.
This made the trustees his agents. The result of the arrangement was that
the husband retained full control over the property, just as if he had
never transferred his property to a trust in the first place. The transfer to
a third party (in this case, trustees) was a sham to disguise the husband's
retention of control until death. "In this case it is clear that the settlor
never intended to divest himself of his property. He was unwilling to do
so even when death was near.
45
American courts, whether following the reasoning of Newman v.
Dore or applying more recent statutes or case law, would mostly concur
with the analysis of the husband's transfer in Shefi and why it was not
effective to insulate his assets from the widow's claim. In addition to the
degree of control over the assets retained by the transferor, other impor-
tant considerations include (i) the proximity of the transfer to the date of
4 Succession Law, supra note 38, at 83, § 155(b).
4 Newman v. Dore, 9 N.E. 2d 966 (N.Y. 1937).
4 Id. at 968.
4' Id. at 970.
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death (in Shefi, the transfer took place three years prior to the husband's
death; in Newman, three days prior); (ii) the amount of the transfer in
relation to the size of the decedent's estate (in both cases, the husbands
transferred all of their assets); (iii) whether the transaction was known to
or concealed from the other spouse (in both cases, the transfer was
concealed); (iv) whether the transferor retained the right to revoke the
transfer, (v) what benefits the transferor retained, such as the income from
the property, (vi) whether the donee was a stranger or someone the donor
would naturally want to benefit apart from any intent to deprive the
spouse (in Shefi, the transfer benefitted a son; in Newman, a niece) and
(vii) whether the surviving spouse had assets of her own with which to
support herself.
6. Although the two cases, Shefi and Newman, reach the same conclusion,
the judges reveal different attitudes towards the husband's behavior. Judge
Lehman, writing for the New York court, is not prepared to condemn a
husband for taking actions in an attempt to defeat his wife's elective
share rights and is even unwilling to term his actions an attempted "eva-
sion." He makes this point by citing an eminent jurist who preceded him,
Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, in two decisions of the U.S. Supreme
Court:
In strict accuracy, it cannot be said that a "purpose of evading or
circumventing" the law can carry any legal consequences. "We do not
speak of evasion, because, when the law draws a line, a case is on one
side of it or the other, and if on the safe side is none the worse legally
that a party has availed himself to the full of what the law per-
mits ... ." "The fact that [the defendant] desired to evade the law . . .
is immaterial, because the very meaning of a line in the law is that you
intentionally may go as close to it as you can if you do not pass it."'
By contrast, drawing his approach from the sources of Jewish law,
Justice Goitein clearly disapproves of the husband's behavior. His attempt
to deprive his wife of maintenance from his estate, to which she is
entitled by rabbinic regulation, is a stratagem that should not succeed.
Justice Goitein also cites an eminent predecessor to support this propo-
sition, the Rosh, Rabbi Asher ben Jehiel, a thirteenth century German
authority who served as chief rabbi in Toledo, Spain, who wrote, "where
anyone attempts to evade a rabbinic regulation by fraud or contriv-
ance.., it is incumbent upon the rabbinic sages of the generation to
frustrate his intention even though there is no proof but only well-found-
Id. at 967 (citations omitted).
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ed legal assumptions."'47
Does this contrast express a difference between a secular system of
law and a religious one? Does the secular system not concern itself with
what lies in the heart of the individual as he or she approaches a line
drawn by the law, while the religious system will stress the purity of
heart and good intentions of its adherents as they organize their affairs in
the light of religiously ordained obligations and requirements?
7. Whether, under Jewish law, the heirs may elect at their option to pay
the widow a lump sum in lieu of her continuing right to support was
debated by halakhic authorities and the subject of various local customs.
In reading the following excerpt, remember that the lump sum monetary
payment mandated by the ketubah (marriage contract) was in most cases
likely to be less than the amount payable to the widow to defray her
maintenance over the course of her widowhood:
Since the widow - if she has not lost her right to maintenance
otherwise - is entitled to maintenance only so long as she has not re-
ceived or claimed her ketubbah by legal process, opinion was divided
already in the time of the Mishnah as to whether the heirs may compel
her to receive it and thereby be released from their obligation to main-
tain her. It was finally decided that this question depends upon custom,
because maintenance of the widow is one of the provisions of the
ketubbah, and in all matters relating to the ketubbah, "local custom,"
i.e., the custom of the place of the marriage, applies, such custom being
considered a condition of the marriage and therefore not to be varied
but with the consent of both spouses. According to the custom of the
people of Jerusalem and Galilee, the choice lay with the widow alone,
and therefore they inserted in the ketubbah a term, "You shall dwell in
my house and be maintained in it out of my estate throughout the
duration of your widowhood." According to the custom of the people of
Judea, however, the choice was left with the heirs and there the corre-
sponding term in the ketubbah deed was therefore "until the heirs shall
wish to pay you your ketubbah." As regards this difference in custom
it was said that while the people of Jerusalem cared for their honor, the
people of Judea cared for their money. The halakhah was decided in
accordance with the custom of Jerusalem and Galilee, i.e., whenever
there is no other fixed custom or rabbinical takkanah, the choice lies
solely with the widow and the heirs cannot deprive her of maintenance
against her wishes.
Responsa of the Rosh, No. 78:3, quoted in Shefi v. Shpitz, (1955) 9 P.D. 1077,
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Inasmuch as economic conditions during marriage may so change
that the estate might be insufficient to provide both for the maintenance
of the widow and for inheritance for the heirs - a state of affairs
which the husband certainly did not intend - many of the authorities
were of the opinion that it is proper to make a takkanah permitting the
heirs to deprive the widow of her maintenance by payment to her
(against her will) of her ketubbah ....
In... Israel there is a distinction between the Sephardi and
Ashkenazi communities.' The former follow the author of the Shulhan
Arukh, i.e., that the choice lies with the widow alone and the heirs
cannot rid themselves of the obligation for her maintenance against her
wishes. The Ashkenazim permit the heirs to do so by payment unto the
widow of the ketubbah even if she does not agree to it.49
8. The widow's right to support from her husband's estate includes the
right to continue to reside in his dwelling so long as she remains a
widow.50 The residence right is personal to her and nontransferable. For
example, she may not rent the residence to a third party and use the
rental income to secure a different dwelling for herself.5 Further, the
right is highly specific and applies only to the exact residence the couple
occupied while the husband was alive in its condition at the time of his
death. The widow does not have the right to repair it. If the residence is
destroyed, her right of residence is terminated.52 At that point, however,
as a distinct part of their obligation to maintain the widow, the husband's
heirs are required to provide her with funds to secure an alternate dwell-
ing.53 By the same token, if the husband did not own a residence at
death, even in a case where the husband sold his residence just prior to
death, the heirs, as part of their general obligation to support the widow,
must provide funds so that she can rent one.54
The question arises why Jewish law imposes on the heirs a separate
obligation to allow the widow to remain in her husband's house, when at
the same time it requires them to provide her with a suitable dwelling as
part of their general duty to maintain her? A distinction may be drawn
between the types of needs these two separate legal duties address. While
' On the origins of Ashkenazic and Sephardic Jews and the differences between
their communities, see HIRSCH J. ZIMMELS, ASHKENAZim AND SEPHARDIM (1976).
" Ben -Zion Schereschewsky, Widow, in THE PRINCIPLES OF JEWISH LAW 402
(Menachem Elon ed., 1975) (citations omitted).
o Laws of Marriage, supra note 14, at 12:1-2.
51 SHULHAN ARUKH, EVEN HA-EzER 94:1 (Remah in the name of Rashba).
" Laws of Marriage, supra note 14, at 18:2.
51 Id. at 18:3.
4 Id.
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the heirs' general support obligation seeks to satisfy the widow's material
needs, the specific right to remain in her husband's house is addressed to
her social and psychological well-being. Allowing her to remain in her
husband's residence saves her from the disgrace of being evicted upon his
death.55 It protects her status within the family by encouraging the heirs,
some of whom may not be her children, to treat her with the same re-
spect as they did while their father was alive.56 It also allows her to
continue her role in the care and education of minor children without the
interruption of eviction. 7 Thus the right to remain in the marital home
tends to minimize for the widow the social and psychological dislocations
occasioned by her husband's death.58 In addition, it insulates her from a
decrease in her standard of living that might force her to seek remar-
riage,59 a situation that would not honor the decedent's memory. For all
these reasons, the heirs' right to dominion over the house as part of their
inheritance is deferred while the widow remains in residence.'
9. A husband in the United States who owned a residence and wished to
leave his widow in approximately the same position she would occupy
under Jewish law might grant her a life estate in the residence by a
provision in his will. He would make the life estate inalienable and
defeasible on her remarriage or the destruction of the house. He would
also expressly withhold from the widow, as life tenant, the authority to
" Nahum Shachar, Madur Ha-Almanah Biveit Baalah [Widow's Residence in Her
Husband's House] 4 LIMUDAI MISHPAT BAR-ILAN [BAR-ILAN L. STUD.] 204, 209
(1985) (citing Responsa of Rabbi Solomon ben Abraham Adret, RASHBA, Part 5, No.
106).
56 Id. at 210 (citing Responsa of Rabbi Judah ben Asher, ZIKHRON YEHUDAH, No.
78).
17 Id.
5' But once the dislocations have in fact befallen the widow, her right of residence
is terminated. For example, if the widow was forced to move out because the
husband's house was destroyed and later the heirs rebuilt it, the widow does not have
the right to move back in or to rebuild it herself. SHuLHAN ARuKH, EVEN HA-EZER
94:3.
" The widow's remarriage terminates her right to reside in her previous husband's
home.
0 The deferral illustrates the far-reaching impact of rabbinic legislation, since the
father's house comes to the heirs at his death as part of the order of succession
prescribed by the Torah. For this reason, some halakhic authorities held that the heirs
had the unilateral option to supply the widow with an equivalent substitute residence
and could take their father's house at his death free of the widow's right. See
SHULHAN ARUKH, EVEN HA-EZER 94:1 (Remah in the name of Mordecha). But the
decided law is to the contrary.
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make repairs or improvements. He would leave the remainder to his heirs.
If, however, the husband and wife owned the marital residence as joint
tenants with right of survivorship or as tenants by the entirety, which is
frequently the case in American common law property jurisdictions, this
avenue would be foreclosed to the husband. Upon the death of the first
to die, the home will belong absolutely to the survivor.
10. Where one spouse owns the family home individually and by will
leaves it to someone other than the surviving spouse, legislation in many
American states allows the survivor and minor children to remain in the
family residence only for a limited period. In some states, statutes grant
to the survivor and children a sum of money, known as a homestead
allowance, in lieu of a right to residence:
Homestead. The homestead allowance [of $15,000] provided for by
UPC [Uniform Probate Code] section 2-402 (1990) is derived, in name
at least, from a uniquely American contribution to the laws giving a
decedent's dependent survivors limited protection in the family home.6
English law is the source of a different idea. Under Magna Carta, the
widow had a right, called the widow's quarantine, to "tarry in the chief
house of her husband for forty days,"'62 and there are early American
decisions recognizing this as a part of the common law. Some American
legislation has extended this right for a year, as in Michigan and Ohio,
or until dower is assigned, as in Virginia. By contrast, more prevalent
American homestead legislation, though framed primarily in terms of
exempting the homestead from the claims of the owner's creditors
during her or his lifetime, commonly grants a decedent's spouse or
minor children a right of occupancy in certain real estate of the dece-
dent that may continue for much longer periods. (A title in fee simple
passes to homestead beneficiaries in Wyoming.) These homestead
statutes vary markedly in the amount and scope of protection given to
family survivors. For example, though homestead titles are typically
subject to ceilings of rather low value, the ceiling may be as high as
$30,000, as in Massachusetts and Wyoming, or there may be no ceiling
at all, as in Minnesota.
The UPC housestead allowance shifts the exemption from a right
of occupancy of realty to a money substitute. In doing so, the UPC
63 The laws are said to have originated in 1839 in the Republic of Texas. Craig A.
Gargotta, Trouble at Blackacre: The Fifth Circuit Takes on the Texas Homestead
Exemption in First Gibraltar Bank, FSB v. Morales, 13-Aug. AM. BANKR. INST. J., 19,
19 (1994), citing Woods v. Alvarado State Bank, 19 S.W.2d 35, 36 (Tex. 1929).
62 4 JAMEs KENT, CoMMENTARIES ON AMERIcAN LAW 61 (lst ed., 1830).
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protects all surviving spouses and minor children, including those of
renters, owners of mobile homes not classified as real estate, and
decedents who owned no interest in a residence of any sort.63
In light of the materials describing the widow's right to her
husband's residence under Jewish law, what do you think of the authors'
description of the homestead statutes as "a uniquely American contribu-
tion" to the laws protecting a decedent's surviving dependents?
11. Under Jewish law, in addition to a right to reside in the decedent's
home, the widow has a right to continue to use the household furnishings
and utensils located therein:
Just as the widow is entitled to maintenance out of her husband's
estate after his death, so is she entitled to garments, utensils and living
quarters, or she may continue to reside in the living quarters occupied
by her in her husband's lifetime, and use the bolsters and cushions, and
the services of the slaves and bondswomen, used by her in her
husband's lifetime.64
In many American jurisdictions, statutes guarantee to the surviving
spouse categories of "exempt property" - items of property used around
the home that pass to the spouse by operation of law upon the death of
the decedent free from the claims of his creditors. Where the decedent is
not survived by a spouse, the exempt property passes to the minor
children. Compare to the excerpt from Mishneh Torah the following
representative New York statute:
(a) If a person dies, leaving a surviving spouse or children under
the age of twenty-one years, the following items of property are not
assets of the estate but vest in, and shall be set off to such surviving
spouse .... In case there is no surviving spouse, such items of property
shall vest in, and shall be set off to the decedent's children under the
age of twenty-one years:
(1) All housekeeping utensils, musical instruments, sewing
machine, household furniture and appliances, including but not
limited to computers and electronic devices, used in and about the
house, fuel, provisions and clothing of the decedent, not exceeding
in aggregate value ten thousand dollars.
(2) The family bible, family pictures, video tapes, and com-
puter tapes, discs, and software used by such family, and books,
61 LAWRENCE WAGGONER ET AL., FAMILY PROPERTY LAW 509-10 (1991).
6' Laws of Marriage, supra note 14, at 18:2.
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not exceeding in value one thousand dollars.
(3) Domestic animals with their necessary food for sixty
days, farm machinery, one tractor and one lawn tractor, not ex-
ceeding in aggregate value fifteen thousand dollars.
(4) One motor vehicle not exceeding in value fifteen thou-
sand dollars .....
Note that ownership of exempt property vests in the widow or minor
children, as the case may be. Under Jewish law, the widow has only the
right to use her husband's tangibles. Upon her death, they will pass to his
heirs.
12. There are striking similarities (and differences) between two principles
of Jewish law discussed in Shefi v. Shpitz and their common law ana-
logues:
A. Justice Goitein cites Rabbi Asher ben Jehiel (Rosh) for the
following proposition:
Where one purchases land, directing that title be placed in his brother
rather than in himself, and the deed is drawn in the brother's name to
evade the wife's lien, my teacher Rabbi Meir ruled that the wife may
collect from the property. Since the purchaser fraudulently intended to
evade a rabbinical rule, his stratagem will not avail him.'
The common law analogue is its doctrine of the "purchase money
resulting trust." Courts held that where one person paid the purchase price
for a parcel of land and at his direction title was placed in the name of
another, the latter held title as a trustee for the benefit of the purchaser
unless it was clear that the purchaser intended to make a gift, for exam-
ple, where the transferee was a natural object of the purchaser's boun-
ty. In some cases, the purchaser's reason for directing that title be
6 NEW YORK ESTATES, POWERS AND TRUST LAW § 5-3.1. Exemption for benefit
of family.
' Rabbi Asher ben Jehiel, Responsa No 78:1.
67 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS §§ 440-42 (1959). A wife or a child would
be considered a natural object of the purchaser's bounty for these purposes, see AUSTIN
W. ScoTr, ABRIDGMENT OF THE LAW OF TRUSTS § 442 (1960), but not a husband:
Since, in the early days of the development of the common law, the wife was
economically inferior and had legal disabilities with regard to taking, holding and
managing property, and normally did not make gifts to her husband, the law presumed
that if she paid for property and had it conveyed to her husband, she expected him to
be trustee for her and did not intend a gift.
GEORGE T. BOGERT, TRUSTS 272-73 (6th ed. 1987). The change in the economic status
of women has led many courts to alter their thinking so that a gift from a wife to her
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placed in the name of another might have been quite innocent, for exam-
ple, to avoid publicity. But when the motive was an improper one, such
as placing the property beyond the reach of the purchaser's creditors, the
courts would enforce the trust for their benefit, allowing them to collect
their debts from the property. The courts, however, would not enforce the
trust on the purchaser's behalf under the equitable doctrine that requires
the claimant to come to court with "clean hands:"
It has been held in numerous cases that where A purchases property and
takes title in the name of B for the purpose of defrauding his creditors,
A cannot enforce a resulting trust. The creditors, of course, can reach
the property; but the debtor himself is not permitted to reach it."
As the Rosh might have expressed it, "his stratagem will not avail him."
B. Justice Goitein cites Rabbi Meir of Rothenberg (Maharam) for
the proposition that "a [lifetime] gift to one's heirs is the same as an
inheritance." The effect is to charge the gift property with the same
obligations that would encumber inherited property, including the widow's
maintenance.
At common law, certain lifetime gifts of a parent to a child were
considered advances against the child's inheritance.69 When the parent
later died, the amount of an advancement reduced the size of the child's
inheritance. The purpose was to equalize the inheritances of children
surviving a parent who, during life, had treated them unequally in relation
to gifts. However, the property a child had received by way of advance-
ment was not considered inherited property for all purposes. It was not
subject to the decedent's debts or estate obligations."0
By contrast, equalization of children's shares is not a principle of
Jewish law.7 The firstborn son takes a double share (unless the firstborn
husband will be presumed. Id.
6 SCOTr, supra note 67, at § 444.
69 See THOMAS A. ATKINSON, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF WILLS 716-20 (2nd ed.
1953) (stating the gift would be considered an advancement against the child's inheri-
tance where the amount of the gift was quite large, was not in discharge of a parental
duty, or could be utilized to earn a profit, unless surrounding circumstances convinced
the court that the parent had intended an absolute gift).
70 Modem statutes, such as UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-109, alter the common law by
requiring written evidence, such as a statement contemporaneous with the gift signed
by the parent or the child, in order to find an advancement, since "[mlost inter-vivos
transfers today are intended to be absolute gifts or are carefully integrated into a total
estate plan." Id. cmt. Further, the requirement of a writing dispenses with the difficult
post-mortem inquiry into the now deceased parent's intention that was necessary under
the common law rule.
"' As Attorney General Yadin has written:
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are twin boys, in which case the double share is canceled72) and daugh-
ters receive nothing if the decedent is survived by a son. Rabbinic
regulation mitigated the status of surviving daughters somewhat by requir-
ing sons who inherit from the father to maintain their sisters until the
latter marry and to give them dowries from the father's estate.73
IV. Words and Phrases
1. "Words in the heart," from Louis JACOBS, THE TALMUDIC ARGU-
MENT 101-102 (1984):
Devarim she-be-lev eynam devarim: mental
reservations in contracts are disregarded
... Devarim she-be-lev eynam devarim literally translated is: 'words in
the heart (= the mind) are not words.' As a technical, legal term the
meaning is: if, in any contractual arrangement, there are mental reserva-
tions contrary to its verbal or practical implications, these reservations
are disregarded.
The sugya [Talmudic discussion] in Kiddushin 49b-50a opens with
an actual case in which the fourth-century Babylonian Amora, Rava,
gave a ruling. A man sold all his property with the clear intention of
emigrating from Babylon to the Land of Israel but said nothing of this
at the time of the sale. Neither in the bill of sale nor in any verbal
statement was any condition attached to the sale, yet all the circum-
stances are such that the man's intention was for the sale only to be
valid if, in fact, he did emigrate, otherwise he wished to retain his
property. Now if the man had stated explicitly at the time of the sale
that it was conditional on his emigrating, if eventually he remained in
Babylon the sale would be null and void, the condition being unfulfilled.
In the case under consideration, however, there was no explicit condi-
tion, only an assumed one, although the assumption was perfectly clear.
Rava ruled that the sale was valid even if the man did not eventually
emigrate. 'It is a case of words,' declares Rava, 'that are in the heart
If there are typically Jewish rules of succession, that is, rules which especially re-
flect the Jewish view, they are: inheritance by blood relatives even to the furthest de-
gree; exclusion of the widow and daughters if the decedent is survived by a son; a
double share to the first born; and testaments in the language of a 'gift,' rather than of
a will.
Yadin, The Succession Law as Part of Israeli Civil Law Legislation, supra note 39, at
41.
' See Shilo, supra note 35, at 447.
73 See id. at 450.
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and words that are in the heart are not words.' The mental reservation
that would invalidate the sale was disregarded by Rava. The point here
is not that the man is disbelieved about his true intention. All the
circumstances go to show that it was. Yet since he made no condition
at the time of the sale, the act of sale itself is without reservation and
the man's mental qualification is insufficiently strong to upset the cate-
gorical nature of the sale. The reason for Rava's ruling would appear to
be that unless the condition has been verbalized it remains vague and
inchoate, without sufficient power to upset the sale. The man's determi-
nation to sell only conditionally is weak, otherwise he would have stated
it explicitly. His mental reservation consists only of 'words in the heart'
and these are not treated as 'words.'
Can you think of any other reasons for not allowing mental reserva-
tions to invalidate or alter the express terms of a sale?
2. "Legal assumption," from 1 ENCYCLOPEDIA TALMUDICA 373-75
(Shelomoh Y. Zevin ed., 1969):
Definition of Assumption
The use of assumption (Heb. 'Umd'na) is a special feature of
Talmudic Law. This arises in the absence of sufficient evidence as to
the truth of some facts in a case which is the subject of legal investiga-
tion. Judgment is then given by reason of an assumption supported by
proofs judicially admitted. Assumptions are of two kinds. There is an
assumption which serves to determine the intention of the one who did
the act in question; and there is an assumption which serves to establish
that that particular act had been done, or who was the person who did
it....
Where, however, the act itself does not afford the slightest proof
as to the nature of intention behind it, no intimation of intention is of
any avail unless the person has expressly made a proper stipulation of
the condition to which his act was to be subject.
Assumption in Monetary Cases
[I]f a man on his sick-bed (likely to die) assigned all his property
as a gift, and kept back nothing for himself, if he recovered from his
illness, he can retract even though his gift was fortified by a legal mode
of acquisition (Kinyan). For it is assumed that his intention had been for
the gift to be valid only if he died, and that should he recover it would
automatically revert to him. In the same way, if one assigns in writing
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all his property to his wife, it is assumed that he merely intended to
appoint her administratrix over his heirs. For there is adequate proof for
the assumption that no man would leave his children destitute and give
everything away to his wife, and that therefore his intention was merely
to make her administratrix so that she might enjoy the respect of the
children.
If a woman about to be married assigned all her property in
writing to another person, it is assumed that her intention was to
exclude her husband from her property so that he should not enjoy the
profits, and her gift is accordingly invalid.
Regarding the last statement in the excerpt, return to the discussion of the
point by Maimonides quoted in the principal case - the gift is invalid
only if the husband dies first; if the wife, the transferor, dies first, the
transferee acquires good title to the property as against the husband.74
Query: How is the concept of "legal assumption" (Heb. umdana)
related to the broader concept of a "legal presumption" (Heb. hazakah)?
For a discussion of the latter, see Menachem Elon, Hazakah, in THE
PRINCIPLES OF JEWISH LAw 590, 590-96 (Menachem Elon ed., 1975).
3. "Social policy"
Tikkun olam is a broad concept with an elusive definition. It encom-
passes all of the considerations an Anglo-American jurist might include
when basing a decision on a public policy rationale, and some authors
have translated the Hebrew term as "public policy."5 In Shefi, it was
translated as "social policy" to indicate the ultimate objective of any ac-
tion taken mipne tikkun olam, namely, to remedy and repair an aspect of
social relationships in a manner that will ultimately redound to the social
betterment of all mankind. For further insights into the term, consider the
following attempt to pin down the meaning of the term in talmudic
literature, from Eugene J. Lipman, Mipne Tikkun Ha' Olam in the Talmud:
A Preliminary Exploration, in THE LIFE OF THE COVENANT 97 (Joseph A.
Edelheit ed., 1986):
This concept has a long and convoluted evolution in Judaism ....
The verb taken derives from the Assyrian root takenu, "to set
straight." In the Hebrew Bible, it appears only in the book of Kohelet,
Ecclesiastes. In two verses (1:15, 7:13) it is declared that individuals
cannot set straight the fundamental futility of human life ....
The Tannaim, the creators of rabbinic Judaism, whose thoughts and
74 See Laws of Original Acquisition and Gifts, supra note 16, at 6:12.
75 See, e.g., RAKOVER, supra note 15, at 747.
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decisions are recorded in the Mishnah and the Tosefta, were the his-
torical instituters of the Takkanah [ordinance] and of the G'zerah
[decree]. It was also during the period of their work (fourth century
B.C.E. to the end of the second century C.E. (A.D.)) that the phrase
mipne tikkun ha'olam came into the vocabulary of Judaism....
. . [T]he words of Chaim Tchemowitz must be given serious
consideration: "In truth, one cannot support these matters (Takkanot) on
the basis of law but only on the basis of the proper and moral, which
the Sages called mipne tikkun ha'olam. .... "
It is as impossible to designate the legal status of tikkun olam in
the Talmud as it is to define the phrase in a way which will cover all
its uses in talmudic literature. Most of the classical medieval commenta-
tors appear to have taken it for granted as an idiom which is used
periodically to serve as basis for one form of Takannah or anoth-
er ....
Olam literally means "world" - the whole world ....
Many translations appear for the word Tikkun. Some of them:
"precaution for the general good" (Danby)
"to prevent abuses" (Soncino ed. Babylonian Talmud)
"for good order" (Strack)
"amendment" (Zeitlin)
It seems to me that in the Talmud, tikkun ha'olam means "for the
proper order of the Jewish community."
It is a long way from that definition to "build a better world." The
evolution was a tortuous one over many centuries. It needs tracing.
V. Questions and Problems
1. From the widow's perspective, contrast the advantages and disadvan-
tages of (a) becoming entitled upon the husband's death to receive
periodic support payments from his heirs during widowhood, on the
one hand, with (b) inheriting a fixed share of the husband's estate
payable in one lump-sum shortly after his death, on the other.
2. While Jewish law permits a woman to use a "deed of concealment"
to defeat her husband's right to inherit her property, it does not
permit a husband to use a similar deed to defeat his wife's right to
maintenance from his estate. What explanation(s) can you offer for
this disparity of treatment?
3. As noted, under Jewish law, the widow's right to maintenance
attaches to the husband's assets at the moment of their marriage,
while under American law, her elective share rights arise only at the
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time of the husband's death. Should this distinction make any
difference in determining whether to regard a husband's lifetime
attempts to defeat his wife's rights as "fraudulent?"
4. A widower married a widow but before the marriage drew a promis-
sory note in favor of a daughter by a previous marriage for a sum
of money and set the due date of the note at "one hour before my
death." After his death when the widow came to collect the sum
stipulated in her marriage contract, the daughter produced the earlier
note and claimed priority over the widow. What result? Would it
make any difference if the father had made the promissory note due
"ten years from the date hereof," fully expecting that his daughter
would never demand payment while he was alive?
7 6
5. Regarding the widow's residence right under Jewish law, consider
the following cases:
A. While the husband was alive, three generations of the extended
family lived together in a single residence - the husband and
his wife, his sons and their wives, and his grandchildren. Now
the husband has died and his heirs are unwilling to continue
the arrangement. They claim the house is too small to accom-
modate the widow along with them and their families. If the
heirs are willing to provide the widow with a suitable alterna-
tive residence, must she move out? If the residence was ade-
quate at the time the husband died but in the course of time
the children's families grew, making the house too small to ac-
commodate everyone, what result? '
B. A mother gave her son as a gift an apartment that she owned
retaining a life estate, i.e., reserving for herself the right to live
in the apartment for the rest of her life. Later the son married
and he and his wife resided in the apartment together with his
mother. Now the son has died and his mother wants to evict
her daughter-in-law. The latter claims she has a right to remain
in the apartment, which was her husband's residence, for the
duration of her widowhood. Who should prevail?78
C. After their father's death, and while their mother was exercising
her right to continue to reside in his residence during her
76 See Shefi v. Shpitz, (1955) 9 P.D. 1077, 1083 (quoting the responsa of Rabbi
Yair Hayim Bachrach, 1639-1702, HAvOT YAiR, No. 200); see RAKOVER, supra note
15, at 746, for an English rendition of this passage.
r See Shachar, supra note 55, at 226-29.
71 See id. at 225 (citing the Responsa of Rabbi Moses ben Joseph Trani, the
MABrr, No. 270).
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widowhood, the heirs sold the house to a stranger. Under
Jewish law, the sale is void.79 After the widow dies, who is
entitled to the house - the heirs or the third-party purchas-
er?80
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